Abstract. We consider the problem of designing approximation schemes for the values of mean-payoff games. It was recently shown that (1) mean-payoff with rational weights scaled on [−1, 1] admit additive fully-polynomial approximation schemes, and (2) mean-payoff games with positive weights admit relative fully-polynomial approximation schemes. We show that the problem of designing additive/relative approximation schemes for general mean-payoff games (i.e. with no constraint on their edge-weights) is P-time equivalent to determining their exact solution.
Introduction
Two-player mean-payoff games are played on weighted graphs 1 with two types of vertices: in player-0 vertices, player 0 chooses the successor vertex from the set of outgoing edges; in player-1 vertices, player 1 chooses the successor vertex from the set of outgoing edges. The game results in an infinite path through the graph. The long-run average of the edge-weights along this path, called the value of the play, is won by player 0 and lost by player 1.
The decision problem for mean-payoff games asks, given a vertex v and a threshold ν ∈ Q, if player 0 has a strategy to win a value at least ν when the game starts in v. The value problem consists in computing the maximal (rational) value that player 0 can achieve from each vertex v of the game. The associated (optimal) strategy synthesis problem is to construct a strategy for player 0 that secures the maximal value.
Mean-payoff games have been first studied by Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski in [1] , where it is shown that memoryless (or positional) strategies suffice to achieve the optimal value. This result entails that the decision problem for these games lies in NP ∩ coNP [2, 18] , and it was later shown to belong to 2 UP ∩ coUP [10] . Despite many efforts [19, 18, 13, 5, 6, 20, 9, 12] , no polynomial-time algorithm for the mean-payoff game problems is known so far.
Beside such a theoretically engaging complexity status, mean-payoff games have plenty of applications, especially in the synthesis, analysis and verification of reactive (non-terminating) systems. Many natural models of such systems include quantitative information, and the corresponding question requires the solution of quantitative games, like mean-payoff games. Concrete examples of applications include various kinds of scheduling, finite-window online string matching, or more generally, analysis of online problems and algorithms, as well as selection with limited storage [18] . Mean-payoff games can even be used for solving the max-plus algebra Ax = Bx problem, which in
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Decision Problem Value Problem Note turn has further applications [6] . Beside their applicability to the modeling of quantitative problems, mean-payoff games have tight connections with important problems in game theory and logic. For instance, parity games [8] and the model-checking problem for the modal mu-calculus [11] are poly-time reducible to mean-payoff games [7] , and it is a long-standing open question to know whether these problems are in P. Table 1 summarize the complexity of the main algorithms for solving mean-payoff games in the literature. In particular, all deterministic algorithms for mean-payoff games are either pseudopolynomial (i.e., polynomial in the number of vertices |V |, the number of edges |E|, and the maximal absolute weight W , rather than in the binary representation of W ) or exponential [19, 18, 13, 12, 20, 17] . The works in [9, 3] define a randomized algorithm which is both subexponential and pseudopolynomial. Recently, the authors of [15, 4] show that the pseudopolynomial procedures in [18, 13, 12] can be used to design (fully) polynomial value approximation schemes for certain classes of meanpayoff games: namely, mean-payoff games with positive (integer) weights or rational weights with absolute value less or equal to 1. In this paper, we consider the problem of extending such positive approximation results for general mean-payoff games, i.e. mean-payoff games with weights arbitrary shifted/scaled on the line of rational numbers.
Preliminaries and Definitions
Game graphs A game graph is a tuple Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ) where G Γ = (V, E, w) is a weighted graph and V 0 , V 1 is a partition of V into the set V 0 of player-0 vertices and the set V 1 of player-1 vertices. An infinite game on Γ is played for infinitely many rounds by two players moving a pebble along the edges of the weighted graph G Γ . In the first round, the pebble is on some vertex v ∈ V . In each round, if the pebble is on a vertex v ∈ V i (i = 0, 1), then player i chooses an edge (v, v ) ∈ E and the next round starts with the pebble on v . A play in the game graph Γ is an infinite sequence
A strategy-profile is a pair of strategies σ 0 , σ 1 , where σ 0 (resp. σ 1 ) is a strategy for player 0 (resp. player 1). We denote by Σ i (i = 0, 1) the set of strategies for player i. A strategy σ for player i is memoryless
the set of memoryless strategies of player i. A play v 0 v 1 . . . v n . . . is consistent with a strategy σ for player i if v j+1 = σ(v 0 v 1 . . . v j ) for all positions j ≥ 0 such that v j ∈ V i . Given an initial vertex v ∈ V , the outcome of the strategy profile σ 0 , σ 1 in v is the (unique) play outcome Γ (v, σ 0 , σ 1 ) that starts in v and is consistent with both σ 0 and σ 1 . Given a memoryless strategy π i for player i in the game Γ , we denote by G Γ (π i ) = (V, E πi , w) the weighted graph obtained by
Mean-Payoff Games A mean-payoff game (MPG) [1] is an infinite game played on a game graph Γ where player 0 wins a payoff value defined as the long-run average weights of the play, while player 1 loses that value. Formally, the payoff value of a play
The value secured by a strategy σ 0 ∈ Σ 0 in a vertex v is
and the (optimal) value of a vertex v in a mean-payoff game Γ is
We say that σ 0 is optimal if val σ0 (v) = val Γ (v) for all v ∈ V . Secured value and optimality are defined analogously for strategies of player 1. Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [1] show that mean-payoff games are memoryless determined, i.e., memoryless strategies are sufficient for optimality and the optimal (maximum) value that player 0 can secure is equal to the optimal (minimum) value that player 1 can achieve.
Theorem 1 ([1]
). For all MPG Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ) and for all vertices v ∈ V , we have
and there exist two memoryless strategies π 0 ∈ Σ M 0 and
Moreover, uniform optimal strategies exist for both players, i.e. there exists a strategy profile σ 0 , σ 1 that can be used to secure the optimal value independently of the initial vertex [1] . Such a strategy profile is said the optimal strategy profile.
The following lemma characterizes the shape of MPG values in a MPG Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ) with integer weights in {−W, . . . , W }. Note that solving MPG with rational weights is P-time reducible to solving MPG with integer weights [20, 18] . 
Approximate Solutions for MPG
Dealing with approximate MPG solutions, we can take into consideration either absolute or relative error measures, and define the notions of additive and relative MPG approximate value.
Definition 1 (MPG additive ε-value). Let Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ) be a MPG, let v ∈ V and consider ε ≥ 0. The value val ∈ Q is said an additive ε-value on v if and only if:
Definition 2 (MPG relative ε-value). Let Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ) be a MPG, let v ∈ V and consider ε ≥ 0. The value val ∈ Q is said a relative ε-value on v if and only if:
Note that additive MPG ε-values are shift-invariant. More precisely, if val is an additive approximate ε-value on the vertex v in Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ), then val + k is an additive approximate ε-value in the MPG Γ = (V, E, w + k, V 0 , V 1 ), where all the weights are shifted by k. On the contrary, additive MPG ε-values are not scale-invariant. In fact, if val is a relative ε-value for v in the
, where all the weights are multiplied by k. In other words, the additive error on Γ is amplified by a factor k in the scaled version of the game, Γ . Conversely, relative MPG ε-values are scale invariant but not shift invariant. The notions of (fully) polynomial approximation schemes w.r.t relative and additive errors are formally defined below. Definition 3 (MPG Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS)). An additive (resp. relative) fully polynomial approximation scheme for the MPG Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ) is an algorithm A such that for all ε > 0, A computes an additive (resp. relative) ε-value in time polynomial w.r.t. the size 3 of Γ and 1 ε . Definition 4 (MPG Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS)). An additive (resp. relative) polynomial approximation scheme for the MPG Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ) is an algorithm A such that for all ε > 0, A computes an additive (resp. relative) ε-value in time polynomial w.r.t. the size of Γ .
Recently, [15] provides an additive fully polynomial scheme for the MPG value problem on graphs with rational weights in the interval [−1, +1]. A natural question is whether we could efficiently approximate the value in MPG with no restrictions on the weights. The next theorem shows that a generalization of the positive approximation result in [15] on MPG with arbitrary (rational) weights would indeed provide a polynomial time exact solution to the MPG value problem.
Theorem 2. The MPG value problem does not admit an additive FPTAS, unless it is in P.
Proof. We start to consider the MPG problem on graphs with integer weights. Assume that the MPG value problem on graphs with integer weights admits an additive FPTAS. Given a MPG Γ = (V, E, w, V 0 , V 1 ) and a vertex v ∈ V , let |V | = n and ε = . Such unique rational is val Γ (v) and can be easily found in time logarithmic w.r.t. n [16] . Thus, we have an algorithm A to solve the value problem on Γ in time polynomial w.r.t. n. The MPG problem on graphs with rational weights can be reduced in polynomial time (w.r.t. the size of Γ ) to the MPG on graphs with integer weights by simply resizing the weights in the original graph [20, 12] .
In view of the proof of the above theorem, we could still hope to obtain some positive approximation results for general (i.e. arbitrarly scaled) MPG by considering weaker notion of approximations with respect to FPTAS. Unfortunately, the next lemma shows that the following is sufficient to show that the MPG value problem is in P: determining in time polynomial w.r.t. the size of a given MPG Γ a k-approximate value of v, where v ∈ V and k is an arbitrary constant.
Theorem 3. For any constant k: If the problem of computing an additive k-approximate MPG value can be solved in polynomial time (w.r.t. the size of the input MPG), then the MPG value problem belongs to P.
Proof. We start to consider MPG with integer weights. Let v be a vertex in the MPG Γ = (V, E, w :
by simply enumerating all the strategies available to the players.
Otherwise, assume 2k +1 ≤ (n−2)!. Consider the game Γ = (V, E, w , V 0 , V 1 ), where ∀e ∈ E : w (e) = w(e) · n!. By hypothesis, there is an algorithm A that computes a k-approximate value val for v on Γ in time T polynomial w.r.t. the size of Γ . Since log(W · n!) = O(n · log(n) + log(W )), T is also polynomial w.r. ] and can be easily found in time logarithmic w.r.t. n [16] .
The MPG problem on graphs with rational weights can be reduced in polynomial time (w.r.t. the size of Γ ) to the MPG on graphs with integer weights by simply resizing the weights in the original graph [20, 12] .
